AFP Distributes Missile Photo Doctored by Iran

That scary photo of the Iranian missile test that ran on front pages everywhere were faked, according to this analysis. The image that appeared in newspapers soon after news broke about the troublesome tests showed four missiles blasting skyward. The image, distributed by Agence France Presse, was obtained from the website of Sepah News, the PR arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Later, a nearly identical image showing only three missiles was released.
    It would seem that the Iranian news agency doctored the image, cloning a missile and exhaust from other parts of the image. AFP retracted the four-missile version.
    Why would Iran add the extra missile? Perhaps President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  felt  that three missiles were sufficiently terrorizing.  (From  what I've heard, the new missiles are essentially  updates of the old Scuds and don't represent a great leap forward in killing technology.) --David Schonauer

Comments

[John Maszka]

While Fareed Zakaria agrees that there is no reason not to use sanctions and embargoes against states such as Iran, he suggests that we also need to “allow a viable way out.” That is to say, we need to negotiate and not merely mandate. Cliff Kupchan essentially agrees. While he acknowledges that President Bush has definitely strained the relationship between Washington and Tehran, he points out that Iran “did agree to suspend enrichment for two years.” Kupchan suggests that there may be more than one way of dealing with Iran. Joel Rosenthal suggests that Ahmadinejad is using the Bush administration’s threats to “rally nationalist sentiment” and take the Iranian people’s focus off domestic problems such as corruption and unemployment. Rosenthal suggests that it’s time the United States allows democracy to change the Iranian regime from the inside. “The United States will have to be much less confrontational” Rosenthal insists, and adds that the “United States wants regime change but may well have to accept that democracy gives people the option to change regimes, but does not mandate such a change.” Richard Betts calls for a calm and clear-headed response to Iran. He reminds us that for all of Iran’s meddling in Iraq, it was Bush that handed Iran an entrance into Iraq. And while we faced a much bigger threat from Mao Zedong in the 1970s, who claimed that China could withstand the loss of hundreds of millions in a nuclear confrontation and still come out standing due to its large population, Betts points out that we’ve “yet to hear anything that chilling from Ahmadinejad.” Betts claims that anyone “who beats the drum for war against Iran fits the classic definition of a fanatic.” Furthermore, Betts assures us that in addition to causing even greater alienation from the Muslim world, a US attack on Iran would most likely only delay Iran’s nuclear capabilities for a few years. This is because the US has “given Tehran ample warning to hide important elements of the necessary infrastructure.” Indeed, Ian Bremmer reports that he heard Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, speak at the Arab Strategy Forum in Dubai, where Larijani “invited other Middle Eastern states to join Iran in a regional security organization that excludes the United States and called on Arab governments to develop nuclear programs to facilitate a nuclear OPEC.” Bremmer agrees with Rosenthal that Ahmadinejad is attempting to win “support at home by taking a harder-line position on the nuclear program.” Bremmer also points out that “Iran isn’t a totalitarian state like North Korea. There’s real opposition in the country to other elements of Ahmadinejad’s political agenda.” Bremmer rejects the Bush administration’s military approach to Iran, suggesting that President Bush needs to “develop a more nuanced and moderate approach, one that stops feeding Ahmadinejad new opportunities to play the defiant champion to the United States” (Gramercy Round, 2007:72-77).
Chester Crocker (2005:55-6) suggests that President Bush has “squandered” America’s opportunity to secure Iran’s cooperation. In a previous era, America could have obtained a “truly global consensus” and presented it to the Iranians. “But the diplomacy of the global war on terror has mortgaged America’s capacity to line up such support.” Ziba Moshaver (2003:284) reports that beyond the US missing its opportunity to partner with European states to win Iran’s cooperation, Iran has taken that opportunity itself, and has “forged a partnership to challenge US attempts at implementing the Bush doctrine.” This partnership (particularly with France and Germany) is aimed at resisting “the US’s desire to change the Middle East regional order to achieve regional hegemony.”